Modern ICBMs typically carry
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (
MIRVs), each of which carries a separate
nuclear warhead, allowing a single missile to hit multiple targets. MIRV was an outgrowth of the rapidly shrinking size and weight of modern warheads and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties which imposed limitations on the number of launch vehicles (
SALT I and
SALT II). It has also proved to be an "easy answer" to proposed deployments of
ABM systems—it is far less expensive to add more warheads to an existing missile system than to build an ABM system capable of shooting down the additional warheads; hence, most ABM system proposals have been judged to be impractical. The first operational ABM systems were deployed in the U.S. during 1970s.
Safeguard ABM facility was located in North Dakota and was operational from 1975–1976. The USSR deployed its
Galosh ABM system around Moscow in the 1970s, which remains in service. Israel deployed a national ABM system based on the
Arrow missile in 1998,
[12] but it is mainly designed to intercept shorter-ranged theater ballistic missiles, not ICBMs. The U.S. Alaska-based
National missile defense system attained initial operational capability in 2004.
[13]

ICBMs can be deployed from
TELs such as
Topol.
ICBMs can be deployed from multiple platforms:
- in missile silos, which offer some protection from military attack (including, the designers hope, some protection from a nuclear first strike)
- on submarines: submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); most or all SLBMs have the long range of ICBMs (as opposed to IRBMs)
- on heavy trucks; this applies to one version of the RT-2UTTH Topol M which may be deployed from a self-propelled mobile launcher, capable of moving through roadless terrain, and launching a missile from any point along its route
- mobile launchers on rails; this applies, for example, to РТ-23УТТХ "Молодец" (RT-23UTTH "Molodets"—SS-24 "Sсаlреl")
The last three kinds are mobile and therefore hard to find.
During storage, one of the most important features of the missile is its serviceability. One of the key features of the first
computer-controlled ICBM, the
Minuteman missile, was that it could quickly and easily use its computer to test itself.
In flight, a booster pushes the warhead and then falls away. Most modern boosters are
solid-fueled rocket motors, which can be stored easily for long periods of time. Early missiles used
liquid-fueled rocket motors. Many liquid-fueled ICBMs could not be kept fuelled all the time as the cryogenic liquid oxygen boiled off and caused ice formation, and therefore fueling the rocket was necessary before launch. This procedure was a source of significant operational delay, and might allow the missiles to be destroyed by enemy counterparts before they could be used. To resolve this problem the British invented the
missile silo that protected the missile from a
first strike and also hid fuelling operations underground.
Once the booster falls away, the warhead continues on an unpowered ballistic trajectory, much like an artillery shell or cannon ball. The warhead is encased in a cone-shaped reentry vehicle and is difficult to detect in this phase of flight as there is no rocket exhaust or other emissions to mark its position to defenders. The high speeds of the warheads make them difficult to intercept and allow for little warning striking targets anywhere in the world within minutes.
Many authorities say that missiles also release aluminized balloons, electronic noisemakers, and other items intended to confuse interception devices and radars (see
penetration aid).
As the nuclear warhead reenters the Earth's atmosphere its high speed causes friction with the air, leading to a dramatic rise in temperature which would destroy it if it were not shielded in some way. As a result, warhead components are contained within an
aluminium honeycomb substructure, sheathed in
pyrolytic graphite-
epoxy resin composite, with a heat-shield layer on top which is constructed out of
3-Dimensional Quartz Phenolic.
Accuracy is crucial, because doubling the accuracy decreases the needed warhead energy by a factor of four. Accuracy is limited by the accuracy of the navigation system and the available geophysical information.
Bookmarks